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Where to, Odysseus? The quest of Greek firms to expand abroad 
1. Introduction 
Where to, Odysseus?  Odysseus is the main hero in Homer’s Odyssey.  His invention of the 
Trojan Horse helped Greeks to win the final and crucial battle and conquer Troy.  Leaving Troy 
after the successful end of the Trojan War marks the beginning of a long voyage, through many 
difficulties to reach his home land, Ithaca.  Different challenges like the Sybligades stones, the 
attractive Sirens and the dangerous narrow pass between Scylla and Charibdi made his journey 
lengthy and intricate.  It was his smartness and commitment to this purpose that helped him 
overcome all the problems and finally reach his destination.  Like Homer’s mythological hero, 
Greek firms in their quest to expand abroad face a number of difficulties. Similar to him, they have 
to use their ownership advantages to overcome obstacles and progress to the next phase where new 
challenges have to be overcome. Nowadays, in an international environment regarded as extremely 
competitive and constantly changing, where rapid technological progress, new production, 
organizational and management systems and a constantly growing role of competition constitute the 
main features, it is vital for countries and enterprises to be internationally competitive in order to 
survive and grow (UNCTAD, 2002).  
According to Dunning, countries follow an investment development path by which they 
switch from being FDI recipients to becoming FDI generators with the increase in their GDP per 
capita. Greece has been until very recently a FDI recipient, and not a very successful one. On the 
other hand, outward FDI increased rapidly. In 2002, FDI in Greece was just 0,6% of its Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (GFCF), whilst the outward FDI was 2,1% of GFCF (UNCTAD, 2003). Greek 
firms grabbed the opportunities and expanded rapidly in the newly opened markets so that during 
the last decade Greece has emerged as a regional player and one of the largest investors in the 
Central and Eastern and South Eastern European Countries (CESEECs) (Demos et al., 2004).  
Greek firms pursuit does not end here.  Recent patterns show that Greek investments are also 
emerging with increasing volumes in other developing and developed countries as well.  
 Greece has thus changed from a peripheral European country to a regional centre, especially 
in its neighbouring South-European countries. This process was enhanced by Greek policies aiming 
to transform the country in a key player for the region. The ‘Greek Balkan Reconstruction Plan’, 
offering almost 500 million euros, is an indicative policy fulfilling that aim (Hellenic Centre for 
Investment, 2005). The financial improvement of Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) as a key source for 
generating funds has further facilitated this expansion. According to data from the Hellenic Ministry 
of National Economy (1998), Greek investment in the Balkan region accounts for almost 12% of 
the total FDI.  More than 2,500 Greek companies have invested in Central, Eastern and South 
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Eastern European Countries (Hellenic Centre for Investment, 2005).  On the other hand, Greek 
companies have also invested in developing countries such as India and China, which have recently  
become popular investment destinations or in developed countries with whom  Greece has had 
historical, economic and cultural ties, such as the UK or the US. 
 This is the first paper to empirically evaluate the determinants of entry mode decisions of 
Greek firms participating in the Athens Stock Exchange  within the framework of Dunning’s 
Investment Development Path (IDP) (1981) and the underlying eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 
1988; 1993).  Greece represents a typical example of how a small, peripheral economy in the 
context of European Union (EU), has increased its regional role through outward FDI, especially in 
its neighbouring countries. This fact constitutes an important step in our understanding of the 
emerging patterns of outward FDI from small peripheral economies in particular in the context of 
an expanded EU.  There are already signs that new EU members such as Hungary have already 
become sources of FDI flows into neighbouring countries, mirroring, yet in an incipient phase, the 
Greek experience.  Hungary has been during the last couple of years the largest investor in FYROM 
(WIIW, 2005). Furthermore, according to UNCTAD (2004:19-29) developing countries such as 
India and China have increasingly generated outward FDI not only in their regions but also more 
widely internationally. 
 The second contribution of the present study is that complements the previous works on 
institutional determinants of FDI (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Brunetti et al, 1997; Oxley, 1999; 
Brenton et al,  1999; Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Resmini, 2001; Smarzynska, 2002;  Tihanyi and 
Roath, 2002; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003;  Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Disdier and Meyer, 
2004; Dunning, 2004; Trevino and Mixon, 2004; Bevan et al, 2004; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; 
Pornarakis and Varsakelis, 2004) by investigating the impact of political institutions on FDI at a 
disaggregate level.  By testing the interplay between location advantages and firm ownership 
advantages in determining a firm’s decision to internationalise, this paper also complements studies 
that have considered country of origin factors rather than firm specific advantages in assessing FDI 
(Grosse and Tevino, 1996;  Deichmann, 2001). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the theoretical 
framework bringing together the IDP and the eclectic paradigm.  Then we describe the evolution of 
Greece through the different stages of IDP.  Section 3 presents the variables and the relevant 
hypotheses providing at the same time a literature review. The description of the data sample and of 
the methodology follows in Section 4. Later on, in Section 5 we present the empirical analysis and 
results. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and review several managerial implications answering our 
initial question, where to Odysseus? 
 5 
 
2.  The Investment Development Path (IDP) and the Eclectic Paradigm: a theoretical 
framework for investigation 
2.1 The integration of IDP and the Eclectic Paradigm 
This paper uses Dunning’s IDP (Dunning, 1981) and the underlying assumptions of the 
Eclectic Paradigm to investigate the evolution of Greek outward investments.  In his seminal paper 
published back in 1981, Dunning explains the International Investment Position of countries using 
‘…a dynamic or development approach’.  The structure and composition of inward and outward 
investment in each stage are explained in terms of the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1981).  Later 
revisions of the IDP, by Dunning himself (1996) or Narula and Dunning (2000) did not alter the  
basic philosophy of the IDP. In order to discuss the application of the IDP to Greek outward 
investments between 1994 and 1999 we first evaluate the merits of the eclectic paradigm in 
explaining firms’ decisions to internationalise. It is the change of eclectic paradigm’s components 
that defines the evolution of a country through the different stages of the IDP.  
The need to synthesize various aspects of the approaches of MNEs and FDI and the desire to 
find an appropriate framework for their empirical investigation led to the emergence of the original 
eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 1988; 1993) which for the last two decades has remained the 
most influential analytical framework for MNEs. It is known mostly as Ownership-Location-
Internalisation (OLI) paradigm.  The basic assumption is that the returns to FDI, and hence FDI 
itself, can be exp lained by a set of three factors:  the competitive-ownership advantages of firms  
(O), indicating who is going to produce abroad ‘and for that matter, other forms of international 
activity’  (Dunning, 1993:142); by locational factors  (L)  ‘influencing the where to produce’  
(Dunning, 1993:143) and by the internalisation factor  (I)  that ‘addresses the question of why firms 
engage in FDI rather than license foreign firms to use their proprietary assets’ (Dunning, 1993:145).  
Using the above propositions one can explain the scope and geography of international value added 
activities.    
 A crucial assumption is that the combination of these factors and their exact configuration 
define which firms become MNEs, when they do so, where they locate their productive activities 
and how they involve in international production.  Dunning (2000) himself characterized the 
eclectic paradigm ‘as an envelop for complementary theories of MNC activity’. The configuration 
of the eclectic paradigm is though context specific.  Despite its generality in explaining 
multinational activity, one has to clearly identify the geographical region under investigation, the 
industry and of course the firms examined. 
 Despite its merits, the major critique for the eclectic paradigm comes from its static nature.  
In response to this critique, an interesting extension of the eclectic framework is offered by Dunning 
 6 
himself (2001).  The strategic response of the firms in changes to their external environment can 
alter the OLI original configuration.  The changes in the external environment can range from 
alterations in the location factors of a specific region to amendments in the competitors’ strategies.   
 The three aspects of the eclectic paradigm interact in a continuous process through which 
firms upgrade their ownership advantages and countries enhance their competitive position in the 
global environment.  The paper thus investigates the interplay between location advantages and 
firms’ ownership advantages in determining the internalisation process by Greek companies. This is 
set within the framework of the IDP also proposed by Dunning (1981). 
According to the IDP,  the net outward investment position of a country, i.e. outward 
investment minus inward investment, follows five stages of development.  Those five stages are 
also closely related to the economic development of the country.  Stage one refers to the least 
developed countries that attract and undertake only a negligible amount of foreign direct 
investment.  In this stage of the IDP, the local political, economic, social and institutional 
conditions are rather a barrier for foreign investors, whilst domestic firms lack the appropriate 
advantages to expand abroad.  
 The second stage of IDP is a natural expansion of the first one.  As the  country develops, in 
terms of economic conditions, stability and infrastructure as well as in terms of the institutional 
framework, it gradually attracts FDI.  During the second stage when location advantages gradually 
emerge, inward investments become commercially viable mainly for three reasons.  First, 
availability of cheap labour force will attract rationalized investments.  Exploitation of natural 
resources emerges as the second reason and finally well-populated developing countries may attract 
import-substituting investments.  This opening up of the home market to foreign investors offers the 
opportunity to local firms to observe and learn from the operations of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), thus upgrading and enhancing their own capabilities or building their own ownership 
advantages.  It is during this stage that the transformation of the local firms takes place.   
Multinationals and FDI can foster the development of the local economy and domestic firms 
through three main channels.  The first one is linked with the training of local personnel.  MNEs 
improve the capabilities of the local labour force by using training programmes or new management 
techniques.  The second channel occurs by building backward and forward linkages with domestic 
firms.  Integrating domestic partners in the MNEs’ supply chain facilitates the diffusion of 
knowledge, therefore transforming local partners.  The third channel is an indirect one and has to do 
with the co-operation of MNEs with local research institutions and universities. This co-operation 
will eventually lead to the improvement of the local knowledge base and capabilities.   During this 
crucial stage, stage two, the local firms create or upgrade their ownership advantages which in their 
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turn will be the driving force behind their expansion abroad.1  At the same time the locational 
characteristics of the home country improve and create a secondary effect boosting local firms’ 
capabilities.  This interaction of ownership, firm specific, advantages with the locational advantages 
leads to stage three.   
 In stage three the country under investigation becomes gradually an outward investor itself.  
Domestic firms make use of their own advantages and expand abroad to exploit them in new 
markets.  We would expect in the early stages of this internationalisation process to observe firms 
expanding in neighbouring, culturally close markets or countries in similar leve l of economic 
development, conform with the Uppsala School (Johanson and  Vahlne, 1977; 1990).  
As the country progresses in stage three and the newly born multinationals accumulate 
knowledge we expect to see them investing in developed countries as well.  In stage four of the IDP 
the country becomes a net outward investor, revealing the level of economic development as well as 
the dynamism of local firms.  The final stage of IDP describes developed economies, i.e. USA, UK, 
Germany etc, with high volumes of inward and outward FDI. 
2.2 The Greek experience  
Greece followed closely the different stages of the IDP.  The opening up of the Greek market 
right after the Second World War was followed by significant investment activities from MNEs.  
Chemicals, basic metals and transportation sector attracted the majority of FDI flows during the 
after-war period, i.e. 1963-73.  These heavy-Smithian types of industries helped a lot to the  
rejuvenation and the expansion of country’s industrial base.  This FDI activity enabled Greek firms 
to accumulate knowledge and experience working closely with large MNEs.   
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the economic development of the country followed by the 
country’s accession to the European Union assured the smooth transition from stage one to stage 
two.  Heckscher-Ohlin type of industries, i.e. textiles, food and drink and consumer electronics were 
the main recipients of FDI flows during the 1980s and 1990s.  At the same time significant steps 
have been taken by Greek governments to enhance the competitive advantages of the economy and 
put Greece in a rapid and stable development path, leading to convergence with the rest of EU core 
countries.  It was no coincidence that with the opening up of neighbouring markets in the early 
1990s the Greek firms and entrepreneurs grabbed the opportunity to exploit their ownership 
advantages and expand abroad.   
                                                 
1  This process of upgrading is related to the dynamic capabilities concept developed by Luo (2000)  and which can be 
defined as ‘ an MNE’s capability to create, deploy and upgrade organisationally embedded and return-generating 
resources in pursuit of sustained competitive advantages in the global market place’.  
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 This expansion came through two channels.  First, foreign subsidiaries of MNEs located in 
Greece upgraded their role to regional headquarters and were used as regional centres for the 
expansion to the Balkans and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). This channel 
included firms  such as Delta, partner of Danone, 3E, a Coca- Cola soft drinks subsidiary, Chipita, a 
PepsiCo food subsidiary and   Intracom, a partner of Siemens working in  telecommunications. 
Second, purely domestic firms became multinationals by seizing the opportunity to expand abroad. 
This strategic change appears to be verified by a prior study of Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (1994) where 
they argue that ‘it is possible for foreign subsidiaries to readjust their market strategies along time 
and in accordance with changing conditions’. This phenomenon of Greek expansion abroad 
gradually took another dimension.  Whilst in the early stages of internationalisation Greek firms 
targeted primarily the Balkans and CEECs, in the later stages we observe investments to other 
developing, but distant countries, as well as investments in developed markets.  This highlights the 
building up of experience and knowledge on behalf of the Greek entrepreneurs.  The ownership 
advantages of Greek firms, supported by the locational advantages of the home markets created 
unique capabilities for Greek firms thus enabling them to invest in other EU countries or even the 
US.  In this context, the aim of this study is to investigate the investment determinants of Greek 
outward investments.  The framework of investigation will primarily be based on the eclectic 
framework, whilst the IDP will be used as an umbrella to explain the different patterns that emerge. 
 
3. Variable description and hypotheses 
In this paper, we use a subset of the several variables proposed by the eclectic framework but 
at the same time the most representatives for multinational firms’ motives (Dunning, 1993).  The 
application of the OLI framework will allow us to discern differences in the internalisation 
decisions of firms engaging in investment activity, either domestically or internationally.  To make 
things even more comprehensible we use domestic investments as a benchmark. We then assume 
that OLI factors not only vary per individual investment but also the spectrum of OLI factors should 
lead to a non-negative, non-zero sum, which should maximise firm returns in order to engage in  
FDI. This is in the line with the notion that OLI advantages are resources able to generate income 
(Dunning, 1993:77).  Although other forms of international expansion, such as   trade, require the 
existence of L and to some extent O advantages it is clear that for a firm to get involved in FDI the 
combination of these advantages must lead to the maximisation of firm’s profits compared to other 
alternative means of foreign market entry. We perform our analysis using an expanded time period 
thus capturing partially the changes in the O and L advantages and their outcome on the  
internationalisation decision of the firm as the home country progresses from one stage of IDP to 
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the next one. An overview of our variables is presented in table 1, together with the relevant sources 
of information. 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
 The first set of factors capture the ownership advantages of the investing firms. Size is an 
obvious ‘transaction cost minimising O advantage’ (Dunning, 1993, Table 4.1:81) which however 
is transformed into an I advantage as it depicts the continuous internalization of previously external 
markets under common governance and  management (Dunning,1993:79).  In various empirical 
studies, size tends to favour multinationality (Horst, 1972) and we thus expect a positive 
relationship with FDI.  In a previous study, Buckley and Pearce (1979) emphasise the role of size, 
arguing that large firms tend to service foreign markets through FDI rather than trade. Numerous 
other studies that have tested firm-level characteristics include that of Juhl (1979) and Grubaugh  
(1987) who also found that size favoured multinationality. On the other hand though, there are 
studies like the one by Hoesch (1998) revealing an opposite effect. In his study on German 
investment in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) he found that it is small, in employment terms, 
German firms that tend to penetrate through FDI in the CEE markets instead of other developed 
European markets.  We thus conclude to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firm’s size will have a positive effect on the firm’s investment decision and will increase 
the probability of internalising the market.  
R&D intensity also raises the probability of a firm to expand internationally.  Through FDI 
firms tend to accumulate new technologies when old technologies become outdated (Shan and 
Song, 1997).  On the other hand, firms from high technology industries enter foreign markets to 
cover their costly R&D, prevent product obsolesce and gain market share (Tihanyi and Roath, 
2002:190). Ownership advantages emerge primarily via two channels for the firm.  On the one hand 
it is the possession of proprietary assets and on the other the actual ability of the firm to acquire or 
coordinate assets (Cantwell, 1989; Dunning, 1993).  We would expect a positive relationship 
between R&D intensity and FDI, but this relationship might be different for various internalisation 
methods.  Our hypothesis is: 
H2: R&D intensity will have a positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and will increase 
the probability of internalising the market. 
Profitability also has an impact on firms’ decision to invest.  Profitable firms not only show a 
more efficient way of organising activities but also create the available resources for the future 
expansion (Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio, 1993).  The relevant hypothesis can be formulated as: 
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H3: Profitability will have a positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and will increase the 
probability of internalising the market. 
Multinationals usually are in a better position to raise capital, either domestically or 
internationally.  This leads to financial assets advantages which reinforce multinationality 
(Dunning, 1993: 162).  Here we use the leverage ratio of the firm as measured by the ratio of total 
debt over own capital and the applicable hypothesis becomes: 
H4: Financial asset advantages will have a positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and 
will increase the probability to internalise the market. 
Finally, administration and distribution costs fall under the category of economies of common 
governance. Caves (1996) used variables capturing the organisation of the multinational group, 
providing support for firm related variables and their effect on investment decisions.  The high 
administration costs can also capture a particular aspect of the resource based view of the firm 
(Penrose, 1956 and 1959) suggesting that the firm’s expansion is directly linked with its managerial 
resources.  We thus include similar variables in our model and we test the following hypothesis: 
H5: Firm specific resources as management quality and distribution channels will have a 
positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and will increase the probability to internalise the 
market .  
 
As a second set of factors, included in the location advantages, a set of economic variables 
was applied. This conforms with the literature and accounts for the different types of motives 
companies may pursue (Dunning, 1993).  This list is not extensive and it is used only to capture the 
general aspects of the macroeconomic environment.  The effect of a country’s market size on 
investment decisions is the most widely tested hypothesis in previous studies of FDI determinants. 
There has been a direct relationship between the current size (Gross Domestic Product) of a 
country's national market and new investments by MNEs (Culem, 1988, Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Barrell and Pain, 1996; Beavan and Estrin, 2004; Bevan et al, 2004).  In addition to that direct 
relationship, an indirect supplement to the hypothesis is that larger host markets are more appealing 
to potential investors as economies of scale are more likely to be captured in local production 
(Krugman, 1979; Amiti, 1998), so that the option of supply through trade (other constraints on trade 
assumed constant) is more readily foregone.  Our hypothesis is: 
H6: Market size will have a positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and will increase the 
probability to internalise the market.. 
Openness as defined by exports plus imports over total trade could be either substituting or 
complementing for FDI (Markusen 1984; Torstensson, 1998).  This variable describes the 
competitiveness position of country in terms of international trade and exposure.  One particular 
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dimension of this variable needs to be stressed here.  High level of competitiveness accompanied 
with price advantages can support FDI strategies aiming at wider markets than the country itself.  
Concentration of production in the most efficient location but still targeting the whole region is the 
most pervasive depiction of this investment behaviour.  The relevant testable hypothesis is: 
H7: Openness of the local economy will have a positive effect on firm’s decision to invest and 
will increase the probability to internalise the market. 
 
This paper goes a step further and incorporates within the location specific advantages, 
political and institutional factors.  This is cons istent with the fact that although scholars 
concentrated initially on factor endowments, especially labour costs and productivity (Bevan et al, 
2004:45),  recently multinationals have increasingly focused on ‘created assets’ (Narula and 
Dunning, 2000) including knowledge-based assets, infrastructure and institutions of the host 
economy. According to Mudambi and Navarra (2002:636), institutions are important determinants 
of FDI because they ‘represent the major immobile factors in  a globalised market … Lega l, 
political and administrative systems tend to be internationally immobile frameworks whose costs 
determine the international attractiveness of a location.  Institutions affect the capacity of firms to 
interact and therefore affect the relative transaction and co-ordination cost of production and 
innovation’.  
For potential investors the incentives and restrictions created by institutions ‘shift the playing 
field favouring some deals and opportunities while discouraging others. They force the investing 
firms to think strategically about how to avoid the limits imposed by domestic laws as well as how 
to reap the benefits that the law and particular circumstances are capable of providing’ (Spar, 2001).  
Poor institutions increase search, negotiation and enforcement costs, thus hindering the 
establishment of new business relationships and the initiation of new transactions (Antal Mokos, 
1998; Meyer, 2001). On the other hand, Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) find that institutions 
alone do not contribute substantially to explaining the cross-country variation of FDI- inflows.  
Instead, they argue that FDI decisions require simultaneous improvements in markets, 
internationalisation and institutions. Increasingly FDI is undertaken not to exploit existing resources 
but by increasing resources and capabilities through the interaction with diverse locations (Bevan et 
al, 2004:45). As a result, investors prefer locations where the institutional framework facilitates the 
development of their firm-specific advantages, thus creating new challenges for both multinationals 
and public policy (Rugman and Verbecke, 2001).  
In our model we use institutional variables which reflect the level of corruption 
(‘Corruption’), the degree of enforcement of the law (‘RuleofLaw), the lessening of the bureaucratic 
burden (BureucraticQuality), the level of ethnic tensions within a country (‘EthnicTensions’) and 
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the existence of expropriation risk (‘ExpropriationRisk’) as provided by IRIS. These variables 
mirror to a certain extent the barriers to investment identified by multinationals in a survey 
conducted by the World Bank (2005) (Appendix, Table 1). The World Bank survey (2005) indicates 
that firms still perceive corruption as an important obstacle in doing business in countries such as 
Romania and Bulgaria, despite them being invited to join the EU most probably in 2007. However, 
the literature on FDI and corruption usually finds inconclusive evidence on their relationship. Using 
Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’, Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) find 
that countries that have a more equitable system of rule of law, lower corruption and more  freedom 
in economic activity  achieved much better performance than countries that are characterised by 
significant deficiencies. Hines (1995) failed to find a negative correlation between corruption and 
total FDI, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found inconclusive evidence about corruption and US FDI, 
whilst Wei (2000) found a negative relation but with a sample dominated by OECD countries.  Our 
hypothesis then becomes: 
H8: Higher levels of corruption will have a negative effect on the firm’s decision to invest 
and will decrease the probability of internalising the market. 
Investors are also deterred by legal instability and bureaucratic  and administrative barriers  
(OECD, 1994). In the same survey, the low ‘confidence in the judiciary system’ is identified as a 
major obstacle for business, particularly in countries lagging behind in terms of economic and 
political reforms, although not exclusively.  Our hypothesis then is: 
H9: A reliable regulatory and legal environment will have a positive effect on the firm’s 
decision to invest and will increase the probability to internalise the market.  
  Foreign investment policies may also attract or deter foreign investors (Stoever, 1986; 
Wint, 1992). Countries with permissive national policies provide incentives to investors through 
exemptions from certain import duties, tax breaks, the creation of free economic zones and 
agreements to discourage double taxation. On the other hand, FDI can be discouraged by increased 
bureaucracy where investment permits, registration or screening are required or where sectoral 
restrictions and barriers exist (Alter and Wehrle, 1993). Using an FDI policy variable based on 
content analysis of several governmental provisions with respect to incoming FDI, Bandelj (2002) 
finds that foreign investors in Central and Eastern Europe are not attracted by financial incentives. 
She argues that this could be a result of the poor implementation of such provisions or of the 
possibility that further incentives are given on a case by case basis. These results indicate the need 
for a more appropriate measurement of the FDI related institutional framework as proposed in this 
study.  
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 The present analysis resembles the one by Adam and Filippaios (2005) who using the IRIS 
(2000) measure of the quality of the local bureaucracy.  They conclude that higher levels of 
bureaucratic quality enhance FDI, especially in non-OECD countries as compared to OECD 
countries.  Our hypothesis is then: 
H10: Bureaucratic quality will have a positive effect on the firm’s decision to invest and will 
increase the probability of internalising the market.  
 The post-cold war era, especially in CESEE, has seen not only political and legal instability, 
but also civil disorder and war as a result of ethnic tensions. If investors seek to minimise the risk, 
then they would avoid locations with high ethic tensions. Although the World Bank Survey (2005) 
does not mention this variable as a perceived business deterrent by MNEs, it does include a related 
variable such as ‘crime, theft and disorder’ as a political barrier (Appendix, Table 1).  In our 
analysis, due to the high number of Greek investments in the region we included a variable 
measuring the ethnic tension and we test the following hypothesis: 
H11: Ethnic tensions will have a negative effect on the firm’s decision to invest and will 
decrease the probability to internalise the market. 
 Finally, Bevan and Estrin (2004) suggest that expropriation risk should be used as a risk 
related variable, potentially being more meaningful for foreign investors than the country sovereign 
risk. In a study of determinants of US FDI in 105 developing and developed countries for 1989-
1997, Adam and Filippaios (2005) find that lower levels of expropriation enhance FDI, especially in 
non-OECD countries as compared to OECD countries.  We incorporate in our model a similar 
variable and test the subsequent hypothesis: 
H12: A high expropriation risk will have a negative effect on firm’s decision to invest and 
will decrease the probability to internalise the market.  
 
4. Sample description and methodology 
In this paper we use a sample of twenty six developing, developed and transition economies 
where Greek companies have made investments between 1994 and 1999.  Table 2 presents the time 
pattern of our sample by host country.  While some early destinations such  as  India, Switzerland 
and Syria have been abandoned later on, there is a clear upward trend towards the late nineties.  
Geographical proximity and the existence of other social and economic links play an important role.  
Two thirds of investments were made in Central, Southern and Eastern European transition 
economies with only 20% in developed countries and 12% in developing ones.  In particular, 
Romania, Bulgaria and FYROM attract the majority of Greek FDI.  This pattern is consistent with 
the total Greek outward FDI as Greece is becoming a regional player.   
Insert Table 2 here 
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‘Food and drink’ and ‘Metals’, two traditional industrial sectors, account for almost half of 
the events in foreign and domestic investments. ‘Textiles’, ‘Flour Mills’ and ‘Packaging’ are also 
quite popular.  As it can be seen from table 3, the variety of sectors do not behave differently when 
it comes to domestic or foreign investments.  The ‘aggressive’ sectors, in terms of investments, 
within the country follow the same practice abroad.  Furthermore,  not only traditional but also 
high-technology sectors  such as ‘Chemicals’, ‘Informatics’ and ‘Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics’  
expand abroad.   
 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
The primary focus of the paper is  to investigate the determinants of investment decisions  
comparing domestic with foreign.  This study though moves a step further and offers also a second  
viewing angle, examining the determinants of the entry mode as a second step. To get further 
insights on the firms’ and locations’ determinants affecting the investment decision, we use a 
multinomial logit analysis.  This unordered multiple choice method is the most relevant.  The 
alternative choices of a firm are always compared with the choice not to invest.  Because neither the 
process, nor the outcomes are sequential, i.e. the investment decisions are ordered, we used a 
similar estimation method to the one used by  Cragg and Uhler (1970)2.  
The major concern with multinomial logit regression is the violation of the independence of 
irrelevance alternatives.  For this reason the test suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984) was 
used to test the consistency of our estimates.  The performed test, presented in Appendix (Table 2), 
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients differ systematically.  Thus the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and the use of multinomial logit generates consistent and efficient estimates. 
   
5. Empirical analysis and results 
Table 4 tests jointly the significance of firms’ characteristics and locational characteristics in 
determining investment decisions. The locational characteristics are separated into purely economic 
and institutional ones.  Our analysis is carried out on four different geographical areas.  We use 
information for the full sample, for investments only in the EU, then for investments only in 
Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe (CESEE) and finally only for the Balkan region. We are 
using as benchmark firms that did not engage in investment activity. CESEE includes Albania, 
Bulgaria, FYROM, Hungary, Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro), Moldova, Poland, 
Romania,  Russia  and Ukraine while the Balkan region is a subset of the CESEE sample which 
                                                 
2 For a further explanation on the multinomial logit regression see Maddala (1997). 
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consists of  Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) and Romania. 
EU is represented here by Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
 Size emerges as an important explanatory factor, but with different levels of significance for 
the various regions. It is more probable overall for large firms to engage in investment activity.  
Expansion to CESEE countries is always positively affected by firm’s size whilst for foreign 
expansion in the EU or the Balkans size is not significant. Large Greek firms participate in 
privatisation programmes in the CESEE region which require significant investment.  
  Leverage is negatively signed and significant for expansion in CESEE but positive and 
significant when it comes to foreign expansion into the EU.  Firms with high ratios of foreign to 
own capital are more probable to expand in EU than anywhere else. High competition within the 
EU market requires a better knowledge of the market which is displayed by multinationals rather 
than companies with mainly Greek ownership. However, Greek ownership represents an asset when  
internationalising in CESEE. 
 R&D intensity and the existence of distribution channels affect positively the expansion 
both domestically and internationally for most regions, with the exceptions for foreign expansion in 
the EU or the Balkans. The pre-existence of extensive and sophisticated distribution channels in the 
EU market and of strong competitors with high R&D intensity makes the related advantages of the 
firm obsolete while the increasing competition in the CESEE market makes the existence of 
distribution channels and the high R&D intensity  significant ownership advantages. The emergent 
stage of Balkan economies from the rambles of civil wars and from the processes of transition 
towards market economy makes so that investors of any calibre in terms of R&D or distribution 
channels may enter these markets.  
 Regarding the economic variables, i.e. locational characteristics, the market size and the  
openness of the local economy are of particular significance when it comes to foreign expansion to 
EU.  Greek investments in the EU are done primarily for market seeking purposes.  This result is 
further reinforced by the positive sign for both variables, indicating a tendency from Greek firms to 
locate in central locations and service the EU through exports.  This is different from their 
behaviour in the Balkans.  Market size is negative on this occasion whilst openness remains positive 
and significant.  In this case local production is not primarily used to serve the local market but 
rather to be exported and serve the Greek or other European markets by exploiting lower production 
costs. 
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 When it comes to institutional variables, corruption is negative and significant for the full 
sample and the CESEE region indicating a tendency from Greek entrepreneurs to operate in 
corrupted environments.  This may suggest that Greek companies have the capabilities to deal with 
environments which mirror to a certain extent cultural traits familiar to Greeks or that they tend to 
assume higher risks in countries where other investors may be reluctant to invest, hence acquiring 
significant first mover advantages. That being said, corruption in the literature does have an 
ambiguous sign when it comes to FDI attraction.   
 Ethnic tensions also emerge as an important factor having the opposite from the 
hypothesised sign.  Greek firms primarily in the CESEE region and the Balkans interpret the 
existence of ethnic tensions as a barrier to entry for other international firms due to high risks.  This 
is not the case for Greek enterprises with large investments in Albania, FYROM or Serbia and 
Montenegro.   
 Finally, when it comes to expropriation risk this has the positive and hypothesised sign for 
most of the cases, indicating that lower risk increases the probability of observing a Greek 
investment. Nevertheless,  a higher expropriation risk displayed by Balkan countries appears to 
attract Greek investors in hope for higher rewards.  It is likely that the risk of sovereign default is 
more of concern for portfolio investors or those involved in currency speculation rather than for 
foreign direct investors who are more influenced by the economic and political stability of the 
recipient country (Bevan and Estrin, 2004:784) 
 The next step in our analysis is to investigate the determinants of the mode of entry for our 
full sample, i.e. foreign and domestic expansion, only the low technology industries and finally the 
foreign expansion.  This complements an emerging strand of research (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Resmini, 2001; Disdier and Meyer, 2004; Trevino and Mixon, 2004) which has dealt with the 
impact of institutions on FDI and on enterprise strategies, notably their entry modes (Oxley, 1999; 
Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Smarzynska, 2002;  Tihanyi and Roath, 2002).   
Table 5 presents the relevant results. For the full sample, i.e. domestic and foreign expansion, 
size increases the probability of a M&A or a greenfield investment, whilst  it is insignificant for 
joint ventures.  Larger firms have the appropriate resources to expand either through an M&A or a 
standalone investment.  On the other hand leverage is negatively affecting M&A, indicating a 
pressure from external debtors to avoid expansion through merging or acquiring another company.  
R&D intensity emerges as always positive and significant, mirroring the effect of the ability to 
generate resources on the firm’s decision to expand irrespectively of the mode of expansion.  High 
administration costs reduce the probability of expansion through a Greenfield investment, indicating 
a lack of further resources, according to the Penrosian resource based view of the firm (Penrose, 
1956; 1958).   
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Insert Table 5 here 
 
 The market size is only positive and significant for JVs possibly being a sign of committing 
resources only to a large enough market.  Openness on the other hand is always positive and 
significant.  When it comes to institutional variables, corruption is negatively signed and significant 
for JVs indicating a tendency from Greek firms to transfer their ability to deal with corruption to the 
new firm but not committing totally to the new investment as it would be the case for M&As or 
Greenfield investments. This conforms with previous research which shows that the quality of 
institutions influences the creation of new firms (McDermott, 2002) and the strategies of foreign 
investors (Henisz, 2000).  In our study, the quality of local administration is important only for JVs 
and greenfield investments, the two cases that demand the creation of a completely new company.  
Finally, ethnic tensions are negatively signed and significant indicating that for all modes of entry 
Greek firms perceive the existence of them as an indication for lower levels of competition from 
international firms.  The picture remains almost the same for our low technology sectors.  The main 
difference emerges from the role of R&D intensity which is now important only for greenfield 
investments, and the quality of bureaucracy which is also important for greenfield investments.  
Because of the nature of transferable skills and resources in this case, only the occasions where a 
firm engages alone in an investment project demand the existence of high R&D capabilities and 
high quality of the offered public services.   
The picture again changes for foreign investments alone and the modes of entry.  Size 
becomes positive and significant for all three modes, indicating an overall trend for larger firms to 
expand abroad.  On the other hand from locational factors it is primarily the quality of the 
bureaucracy that affects positively the decision and the existence of ethnic tensions that increases, 
through decreasing local competition, the probability of investing abroad. 
 
6. Conclusions and managerial implications  
Previous research has shown that managers should investigate carefully the institutional 
environment of the country before decid ing to internationalise (Trevino and Mixon, 2004:241) 
while governments should improve the institutional framework of the country. A very recent and 
influential contribution belongs to Dunning (2004) who discusses extensively the role of 
institutional infrastructure in upgrading the pull factors determining the competitive advantages of 
countries and regions, examining the European transition economies.  This study has gone a step 
further by showing in particular which type of investors can make the most of the different location 
advantages of the EU as compared to CESEE or to a smaller sample of countries, the Balkans. 
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 Within the third stage of the Greece’s Investment Development Path, investors with low 
R&D intensity and without established distribution channels can initially invest in the Balkan 
countries. Given the relatively slower progress of these economies towards improving their 
institutional framework and economy in general, there are fewer pressures from competitors. 
Hence, ownership advantages are not particularly relevant in this case. Investors should see the 
potential for growth in these markets as a result of continuous reforms, free trade and financial 
support through the ‘Pact of Stability in South Eastern Europe’. They should aim to acquire first 
mover advantages by investing when domestic markets are still small. A relatively lower GDP of 
these countries should encourage Greek investors to relocate production units to obtain higher 
efficiency while exporting products both to the EU and the other countries in the region as a result 
of high openness. Investors should be ready to work within a framework where legislation is poorly 
implemented and highly volatile, and they may actually benefit from loophole in legislations in 
finding business opportunities. They may want though to keep on eye on the changes within the 
environment and make provisions for losses that may appear of the results of these changes. By 
expecting a high expropriation risk in the area, managers may want to build political support from 
the government or may want to minimise their initial investment while this risk remains relatively 
high.  
 In a second phase, large Greek companies with high R&D intensity, strong distribution 
channels and looking to expand sales whilst achieving increased efficiency may invest in the 
CESEE. They have to be, however, ready to deal with a corrupt environment hence to use their 
‘Greek-ness’ as a competitive advantage within an environment with increasing competition. They 
should though be aware that these countries are setting up on cracking corruption even more, so 
playing the ‘rules of the game’ should not mean encouraging corruption themselves. Investors in the 
CESEE  should also  have a strategy in place to deal with higher prospects of ethnic tensions by 
locating their operations in areas within these countries which are  less likely to be affected or  by 
disguising their ‘Greek-ness’ in places such as the FYROM, where this may be a liability. They 
may encourage through their corporate citizenship agenda some activities leading to the diffusion of 
ethnic tensions.   
 Finally, expansion into the EU is undertaken primarily by an investor which is market 
seeker and does not necessarily have a high R&D intensity, nor specialised distribution channe ls. It 
may even be a small investor addressing a niche market. By investing in the Balkans and the 
CESEE, companies can upgrade their capabilities of dealing with ethnic tensions and then transfer 
them to other investment locations. Greek investors may also seek to exploit loopholes in the 
legislation of the over-regulated European Union and thus exploit business opportunities not evident 
at a first glance.  
 19 
 The second step of your investigation has revealed several factors that may guide managers 
in the decision to engage in a certain type of internalisation, be it a joint venture, a merger and 
acquisition or a green field project.  Thus, in highly corrupted environments with high potential 
ethnic risks and a good bureaucratic quality Greek investors should establish joint ventures with a 
local partner. They can thus share the risks and benefit from the local partner’s capabilities in 
dealing with the relatively less developed institutional framework. A manager should consider the 
option of establishing a green field investment if the company is large,  R&D intensive and has low 
administration costs. The presence of strong distribution as an ownership advantage is not 
necessary. However, for a green field investment the manager has to make sure that the bureaucratic 
quality is high. Furthermore, in order to set up a  green field project  in a low tech industry,  the 
investor needs to have high R&D intensity, low administration costs and considerable resources. In 
the case of Greek subsidiaries of multinationa l companies wanting to expand abroad,  the option for 
M&As is less likely due to pressure for profitable investment by the mother company.  
This paper has shown how the interplay between ownership and location advantages has 
influenced the  quest of Greek  firms expanding abroad by focusing on institutional variables and 
firm level ownership data. Further research may investigate the expansion of Greek firms in an 
extended time frame. Comparisons can be then made between the Greek firms’ experience and the 
internationalisation of firms originating from new EU member states,  thus verifying the answers 
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Table 1.  Variable Description 
  Description Source 
Size Logarithm of Total Assets  
Annual Reports of 
Firms enlisted in 
Athens Stock 
Exchange (1991 – 
1999) and Authors’ 
Calculations 
Leverage Short and Long Term Debt over Own Capital As above 
Profitability Profits over Total Sales As above 
R&DIntensity Research and Development Expenses over Total Sales As above 
AdministrationCosts  White Collar Salaries over Total Sales As above 
Firm 
Variables 
DistributionChannels  Distribution Costs over Total sales As above 
 
MarketSize 
Real GDP in constant dollars        (expressed in 
international prices, base 1985.) 










Lower scores indicate "high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout lower 
levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected 
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
 assessment, police protection, or loans."  
Values 0-6 
 
IRIS-3 File of 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Data 
RuleofLaw 
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens 
of a country are willing to accept the established 
institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes."  Higher scores indicate:  "sound 
political institutions, a strong court system, and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power."  Lower 
scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical 
force or illegal means to settle claims."  Upon changes 
in government new leaders "may be less likely to 





High scores indicate "an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training," "autonomy from political 
pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 





This variable “measures the degree of tension within a 
country attributable to racial, nationality, or language 
divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries where 
racial and nationality tensions are high because 
opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal, even though such 







This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation 
and forced nationalization" of property.  Lower ratings 
"are given to countries where expropriation of private 





Table 2. Investments by host country and year of investment 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 TOTAL 
Albania 1     1   1 3 
Belgium     1   1 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 6  10 
China    1  2  3 
Egypt     1  1 2 
France    1  1 1 3 
FYROM    3  2 1 6 
Georgia Republic      1  1 
Germany   1   2  3 
Greece 5 4 4 10 15 19 57 
Hungary       1 1 
India   1     1 
Liberia      1  1 
Moldova 2 1     3 
Nigeria    1    1 
Poland   1  1   2 
Portugal    1  1  2 
Romania   3 1 1 5 5 15 
Russia    1    1 
Spain      1  1 
Switzerland 1      1 
Syria 1      1 
Ukraine      1  1 
United Kingdom      2  2 
USA     1 2 1 4 
Yugoslavia   1  2   3 




Table 3. Investments by sector of participation of mother company and location 
 
 ABROAD LOCAL TOTAL 
Chemicals 5 2 7 
Construction Materials 4 1 5 
Constructions General     0 
Flour Mills 6 4 10 
Food & Drink 22 12 34 
Holding 2 4 6 
Hotels     0 
Informatics 1 6 7 
Leasing     0 
Metals 11 13 24 
Packaging 7   7 
Pharmaceuticals & Cosmetics 5 7 12 
Sea Transports     0 
Smoke and cigars     0 
Telecommunications     0 
Textiles 6 5 11 
Various 3 3 6 
Wood and Products     0 
Total 72 57 129 
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Table 4.  Comparison between Domestic and Foreign Investment, Multinomial Logit estimation with robust standard errors 
Comparison Group = No investment  
  FULL FULL EU EU CESEE CESEE BALKANS BALKANS 
  Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
 Variable         
 Size 0.399** 1.382*** 0.294* -0.150 0.452*** 1.064** 0.403* -7.660 
  (2.36)  (2.93) (1.85) (-0.70) (3.04) (1.98) (1.73) (-1.22) 
 Leverage -0.098* -0.063 -0.063 0.005* -0.097*** -0.145*** -0.105 -4.034 
  (-1.94) (-0.24) (-1.29) (0.08) (-2.61) (-2.70) (-1.16) (-0.75) 
 Profitability -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 -1.669 
  (-0.11) (0.06) (-0.10) (0.05) (-0.65) (0.53) (-0.10) (-0.17) 
 R&DIntensity 0.352*** 0.299 0.390*** 0.170 0.352*** 0.308*** 0.365*** -0.224 
  (4.63) (1.17) (5.13) (0.95) (4.17) (3.68) (3.97) (-0.82) 
 AdministrationCosts -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 
  (-0.80) (-1.16) (-0.40) (0.66) (-0.82) (-0.48) (-0.52) (1.17) 
 DistributionChannels 0.246** 0.699** 0.189* 0.968 0.245** 0.691*** 0.252* -0.727 
  (2.38) (2.40) (1.84) (0.57) (2.27) (4.15) (1.90) (-0.38) 
 MarketSize 0.208 -0.275 -0.237 0.442*** 0.074 -0.243 0.324 -0.727*** 
  (1.22) (-1.19) (-0.94) (2.72) (0.76) (-1.16) (0.82) (-3.39) 
 Openness 0.021 0.277*** -0.098 0.217*** -0.00831 0.257* 0.163 0.101*** 
  (0.29) (2.97) (-0.61) (3.20) (-0.09) (1.92) (0.51) (13.53) 
 Corruption -1.603 -0.641*** -0.224 -0.262 -1.233 -0.486** -0.70024 0.198 
  (-0.73) (-2.69) (-0.79) (-0.98) (-0.65) (-2.26) (-1.13) (0.69) 
 RuleofLaw -0.659 1.584 0.162 -0.134** -0.738 0.080 -0.171 -0.245* 
  (-1.06) (1.30) (0.19) (-2.34) (-1.07) (0.04) (-0.93) (-1.63) 
 BureaucraticQuality 1.119 3.124** 1.432 0.341 0.196 0.689 -0.118 0.996 
  (0.69) (2.00) (1.05) (0.89) (0.31) (0.67) (1.13) (0.25) 
 EthnicTensions -0.625** -0.766** 0.769 -0.773*** -0.385 -0.429** -0.410 0.280 
  (-2.02) (-2.45) (0.57) (-2.65) (-1.47) (-2.01) (-0.06) (0.73) 
 ExpropriationRisk 1.005 0.336*** -0.576 0.178** 0.119 0.279** 0.347 -0.100*** 
  (1.32) (2.77) (-0.50) (2.05) (1.44) (2.09) (1.32) (-6.01) 
          
Number of obs  1275  1220  1251  1242  
Pseudo R-square  0.852  0.851  0.856  0.842  
Wald Chi-Square  702.87  693.21  653.13  612.35  
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -206.66  -207.69  -197.73  -189.63  
z-statistics in parenthesis 
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5% 
* significant at 10%
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Table 5. Comparison of Mode of Entry for all investments, Multinomial Logit estimation with robust standard errors  
Comparison Group = No investment  
 Variable Full   Full Low 
Tech 
  Foreign   
  Joint 
Ventures 
M&A GreenField Joint 
Ventures 




 Size 0.411 0.403** 0.916*** 0.183 0.559** 1.138*** 1.735* 2.603** 2.377** 
  (1.47) (2.23) (2.67) (0.57) (2.57) (2.84) (1.71) (2.48) (2.43) 
 Leverage -0.069 -0.093* -0.122 -0.062 -0.097 -0.103 -0.261 0.262 -0.599* 
  (-0.67) (-1.68) (-1.11) (-0.56) (-1.59) (-0.59) (-0.52) (1.55) (-1.94) 
 Profitability -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.004 -0.006 -0.198 -0.649 0.034 
  (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.13) (-0.53) (0.42) 
 R&DIntensity 0.432*** 0.228*** 0.564*** 0.320 0.829 0.601*** 0.877 -0.642 0.597 
  (3.96) (2.23) (4.83) (1.43) (0.40) (3.38) (0.92) (-1.41) (0.54) 
 AdministrationCosts -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** 0.002 0.004 -0.003* -0.009 -0.005 -0.001 
  (-0.97) (-0.25) (-2.4) (0.17) (0.50) (-1.82) (-0.79) (-0.47) (-1.16) 
 DistributionChannels 0.282* 0.290*** 0.273 0.217 0.221 -0.26915 0.734 0.611 0.244 
  (1.77) (2.64) (1.18) (1.17) (1.54) (-0.06) (0.55) (0.43) (0.18) 
 MarketSize 0.247* 0.184 0.143 0.258* 0.107 0.052 -1.208 -1.681 -1.292 
  (1.75) (1.39) (0.96) (1.89) (0.85) (0.35) (-0.51) (-0.71) (-0.55) 
 Openness 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.145*** 1.127 1.127 1.119 
  (2.92) (2.83) (2.93) (2.85) (2.71) (2.81) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) 
 Corruption -3.756* -3.074 -2.838 -3.939* -3.287 -3.027 -3.068 -2.954 -2.888 
  (-1.93) (-1.60) (-1.44) (-1.73) (-1.46) (-1.31) (-1.4) (-1.34) (-1.32) 
 RuleofLaw -0.088 0.028 -0.997 -0.067 0.176 -1.422 2.049 1.926 1.839 
  (-0.14) (0.05) (-1.31) (-0.09) (0.28) (-1.48) (1.46) (1.37) (1.31) 
 BureaucraticQuality 2.474* 1.848 2.256* 2.546 1.925 3.021* 0.940* 0.864* 0.920* 
  (1.94) (1.47) (1.73) (1.61) (1.24) (1.86) (1.85) (1.70) (1.82) 
 EthnicTensions -5.731** -5.638** -6.055*** -4.728** -4.742** -4.477** -1.214* -1.304** -1.163* 
  (-2.49) (-2.46) (-2.62) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-1.98) (-1.81) (-2.09) (-1.87) 
 ExpropriationRisk -0.232 0.401 -0.061 -0.441 0.214 -0.623 0.896 1.306 0.909 
  (-0.37) (0.71) (-0.10) (-0.64) (0.33) (-0.86) (0.36) (0.52) (0.36) 
Number of obs  1275   1149   1222   
Pseudo R-square  0.837   0.862   0.969   
Wald Chi-Square  104.91   94.44   328.40   
Log Pseudo 
Likelihood  -287.69   -218.83   -51.72   
z-statistics in parenthesis 
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5% 





Table 1. Firms’ perceptions of business barriers in selected transition countries. In parenthesis the grading of importance (2002) 
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Source: World Bank (2005)  
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Table 2. Independence of Irrelevance Alternatives 
 
 Observations  Hausman Degrees of Freedom 
All investments    
No investment 120 -9.12 11 
Investment Domestically 1222 3.14 11 
Investment Abroad 1208 9.87 9 
    
All investments    
No investment 120 3.35 20 
Joint Venture 1244 -7.64 11 
Merger& Acquisition 1204 6.97 12 
Greenfield investment 1257 -3.31 11 
    
All investments  
Low Technology     
No investment 94 6.63 20 
Joint Venture 1125 -12.86 12 
Merger& Acquisition 1092 -15.53 14 
Greenfield investment 1136 -28.41 10 
    
Foreign Investments    
No investment 67 1.22 19 
Joint Venture 1198 -5.62 22 
Merger& Acquisition 1194 -1.97 17 




Table 3. Correlation Table 
 
FDIDUMMY 1.00                     
Type -0.89* 1.00                    
Ownership 0.06 0.42* 1.00                   
Size -0.19* 0.21* -0.04 1.00                  
Leverage 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 1.00                 
Profitability 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 1.00                
R&Dintensity -0.17* 0.14* -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 1.00               
AdministrationCosts  -0.14* 0.17* -0.06 0.62* 0.03 -0.01 0.13* 1.00              
DistributionChannels  -0.10* 0.10* 0.18 0.00 0.11* -0.03 0.04 -0.01 1.00             
MarketSize 0.41* -0.60* -0.06 -0.25* 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.20* -0.08* 1.00            
Openness -0.33* 0.48* 0.07 0.24* -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.22* 0.05 -0.77* 1.00           
Corruption 0.39* -0.53* 0.08 -0.19* 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.20* -0.05 0.63* -0.46* 1.00          
Ruleof Law 0.22* -0.29* -0.01 -0.09* -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.14* -0.05 0.41* -0.39* 0.49* 1.00         
BureaucraticQuality 0.18* -0.27* 0.05 -0.10* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.15* -0.04 0.33* -0.41* 0.66* 0.42* 1.00        
EthnicTensions 0.39* -0.53* 0.02 -0.19* 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.25* -0.05 0.63* -0.46* 0.80* 0.44* 0.38* 1.00       
ExpropriationRisk 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.12* -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14* 0.15* 0.30* 0.33* 0.25* 0.38* 1.00      
EU 0.41* -0.62* -0.08 -0.20* 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.23* -0.07 0.80* -0.63* 0.79* 0.42* 0.52* 0.70* 0.21* 1.00     
CESEE 0.27* -0.33* 0.03 -0.11* 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.43* -0.10* 0.36* 0.11* -0.22* 0.33* 0.01 0.34* 1.00    
Balkans 0.31* -0.43* 0.02 -0.14* 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.11* -0.07 0.50* -0.22* 0.45* 0.20* -0.13* 0.48* 0.05 0.47* 0.86* 1.00   
FDI  -0.45* 0.68* 0.06 0.21* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.21* 0.09* -0.83* 0.64* -0.76* -0.38* -0.34* -0.74* -0.17* -0.90* -0.59* -0.69* 1.00  
Sector -0.13* 0.12* 0.18 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.25* 0.07 0.15* -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.08* -0.07* 0.05 1.00 





















   
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/kbs/research-information/index.htm 
